Illness or Deviance? Drug Courts, Drug Treatment, and the Ambiguity of Addiction by Reinarman, Craig
UC Santa Cruz
UC Santa Cruz Previously Published Works
Title
Illness or Deviance? Drug Courts, Drug Treatment, and the Ambiguity of Addiction
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6gv97775
Journal
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 121(6)
ISSN
0002-9602
Author
Reinarman, Craig
Publication Date
2016-05-01
DOI
10.1086/685721
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Illness or Deviance?:  Drug Courts, Drug Treatment, and the Ambiguity 
of Addiction.  By Jennifer Murphy.  Philadelphia, PA:  Temple University 
Press, 2015.  Pp. viii+219.  $26.95 (paper). 
Craig Reinarman
University of California, Santa Cruz
“Enlightened coercion” and “therapeutic punishment” are not 
oxymorons, according to the drug court movement.  Drug court judges 
rightly call what they do a “movement.”  Many see themselves as 
“missionaries, leading lost souls to salvation” (58), and they have 
created over 2,700 drug courts since they were first invented in 1989 
to cope with the flood of crack cases.  They stand on a dual premise:  
since addiction underlies much crime, treating it will reduce recidivism;
but since voluntary treatment is often powerless against addiction, the 
“therapeutic tool” of punishment is required for treatment to succeed. 
This has changed the criminal justice system.  Drug courts are now the
largest source of referrals to treatment.  People arrested for drug 
offenses must plead guilty and waive their right to trial to be 
“accepted” into drug courts.  Defense attorneys must drop their 
adversarial role and become part of the drug court “team,” meeting 
with judges, therapists, probation officers, and prosecutors to share 
details of the participants’ behavior and determine their “needs” – not 
for a vigorous defense or fair trial but for the optimal mix of “carrots 
and sticks” needed for “recovery.”  “Participants” who succeed say 
drug courts helped turn their lives around; those who don’t can end up 
worse off.   
The core question in this book is whether addiction is a disease that 
should be treated or a crime that should be punished.  Author Jennifer 
Murphy digs into this by means of an institutional ethnography of a 
drug court and affiliated treatment programs to see how they define 
and deploy the concept of addiction.  Her inductive, grounded theory 
approach weaves together observations of a drug court and affiliated 
treatment programs, depth interviews with staff and participants, and 
an analysis of court documents.  The result is a fascinating case study 
in social constructionism that illustrates the continuing relevance of 
labeling theory and raises critical questions about the medicalization of
addiction.  Disease and deviance are different discourses and point in 
different policy directions.  But she shows that drug courts, treatment 
programs, and most of the public see addiction as both.  
A central theme is the fundamental ambiguity of addiction-as-disease.  
Addiction is empirically constituted by specific institutional practices 
that label and manage drug users.  As Murphy shows, the ambiguous 
definition of addiction is functional; it legitimates the paradoxical policy
mix of drug courts.  Because drug addiction can be construed as 
disease, addicts can get treatment.  Because addiction remains 
criminalized, this treatment rests (often uneasily) on punishment.   
“Therapeutic punishment,” is meted out for a “dirty urine” indicating 
drug use, but also for failing to find a job or breaking rules about 
attendance and punctuality.  Punishments range from trivial to tragic --
writing an essay for the judge on the importance of keeping therapy 
appointments or being sentenced to a full prison term.  Judges and 
treatment providers alike justify all such punishments in terms of 
therapeutic value.  
The National Institute of Drug Abuse has long tried to establish 
addiction as a disease.  But Murphy shows that such medicalization 
efforts remain ineluctably partial.  In drug courts and the treatment 
programs they feed and fund, the omnipresent threat of punishment 
marks addiction as distinct from other diseases.  Cardiac patients or 
diabetics who “slip” and eat cheesecake or miss medical appointments
are not sent to jail.  As Murphy puts it, “Is there any other disorder, 
even another mental health problem, where treatment demands that a
person do a moral assessment of his or her own defects and 
weaknesses?” (131)  
Americans have been socialized by a century of racialized drug scares 
that stigmatized drug users as immoral criminals.  That stigma still 
permeates the culture, so we end up with a medical/moral hybrid -- a 
disease that is punished.  Indeed, Murphy suggests that attempts to 
medicalize addiction have given new shapes to the old stigma.  The 
latest neurocentric view of addiction as a chronic brain disease leaves 
addicts powerless before their damaged neuronal networks and thus 
helps justify coercive control.  The most effective treatment for opiate 
addiction is methadone maintenance, but methadone patients remain 
stigmatized as “still addicted.”  The 12-Step model of Alcoholics 
Anonymous is central to drug courts and treatment programs, but this 
model, too, smuggles in moralistic assumptions about addiction 
stemming from a “spiritual void” within the addict.   
Murphy’s drug court judges and treatment program staff are 
overwhelmingly educated, middle-class whites while their charges are 
mostly poor blacks with little education.  The judges and treatment 
staff understand that addicts’ problems stem in significant part from 
social-structural factors like chronic joblessness.  Yet the solutions they
impose all focus on addicts’ “individual responsibility” (which could be 
called sociological denial).  The stresses of poverty contribute to 
participants’ family problems, but these get translated into symptoms 
of addiction.  Murphy notes how this skews causal influence in one 
direction:  “Addiction becomes the source of other social problems 
rather than the result….” (19)
The empirical spine of this book is a single-city case study, and the 
author is laudably candid on its limitations.  It is, however, a rich case 
study, well situated in relevant literatures and packed with interesting 
data and analytic insights that lay bare the common conundrum faced 
by other drug courts and treatment programs. Professionals in criminal
justice and treatment will find the book provocative in the best sense, 
and it will provide valuable material for courses on addiction, criminal 
justice, deviance, and public health. 
Murphy supports treatment, but remains skeptical about how drug 
courts do it.  “Drug courts are better than merely locking up offenders. 
But why are these our only two choices?” (172).  She includes moving 
accounts of life-altering recovery by some participants grateful for drug
courts, but she also shows that despite medicalization, courts and 
treatment programs continue to stigmatize and punish addicts in ways 
that dig them deeper into the hole.  While she recommends thinking 
more seriously about harm reduction, diversion, and decriminalization, 
she sees no clear path out of the fundamental ambiguity of addiction 
that lies at the heart of drug courts.[]
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